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Abstract
Modern approaches towards the understanding of the behaviour of systems and
policies have recently been driven by the abundance of open and non-open
data moving away from the classical model-based approaches, in which data
were secondary to the solution. In this paper, we present a similar approach by
suggesting that the analysis of the risk probability for access control and security
policies can be based on an empirical data-driven study. We outline a constraint-
based approach that allows organisations to examine policies in light of the
probabilities of internal actors damaging organisational assets. Our approach is
validated using Verizon’s open community dataset for security incidents, known
as VERIS/VCDB.
Keywords: Access Control, Data-driven Risk, Security Policies, Security
Constraints, Security Datasets
1. Introduction
The use of the term data-driven has nowadays become synonymous with the
application of various analysis techniques to large (open) datasets in order to
understand better the behaviour and properties of computing and IT systems.
This approach, with data at its heart, is slowly but surely overtaking classical
pure model-driven approaches, where data are oftentimes considered secondary
or even irrelevant to the problem at hand. Instead, a data-driven approach
makes use of the information and knowledge embedded within the data to vali-
date our understanding of the behaviour and characteristics of the systems we
develop and utilise. For example, in recent years, Google has gradually replaced
the heavyweight machine learning algorithms underlying its automatic language
translation service, Google Translate, with purely statistical-based algorithms
[1] applied to its large corpus of data.
In the computer and security research community, utilising data as a source
of information and knowledge has been accomplished to varying degrees of suc-
cess. There are still many factors that obstruct and hinder the adoption of open
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data in this field. Some such factors are political, for example, the continuing
diffidence on the part of commercial organisations to share data due to the fear
that such data may eventually reveal sensitive information. Others are more
technical, related to the consistency, quality and the lack of consensus on the
nature of variables that should be monitored or indeed the metrics that should
be used to quantify the data themselves [2]. There are also philosophical ques-
tions related to whether past data are in any way relevant to future events [3].
Nonetheless, in recent years, this trend has started to shift with the arrival of
large open datasets backed by the reliability of reputable organisations (e.g.
VCDB [4] and CERT’s Vulnerability Notes Database at Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity [5], SecRepo [6], CAIDA [7], LANL [8]), and we have started to notice
an increasing use of such datasets.
The main goal motivating our work here is to demonstrate how open data can
be used to evaluate and reason about security policies based on risk probabilities.
We consider one example approach for evaluating the risk probability associated
with access control policies defined in XACML [9] based on information recorded
in the community-based open dataset, VERIS/VCDB [10, 4]. Thus, we combine
both the data-driven approach in policy configuration with standards in defining
access control policies. In doing so, we agree with the view by [2] that past data
are still relevant to new security incidents and that despite the fact that the
road ahead may bend with human whim and technological advance, . . . it does
not appear to bend too sharply too often. Our view therefore is that such past
data can still be used to gain some approximate knowledge of how systems
should be controlled and defended through the understanding of the level of
risk probability that their access control policies imply, before such policies are
deployed. Our focus on a standard such as XACML ensures that our approach
has wide and general applicability and is not restricted to proprietary languages.
We adopt a frequency-based definition of risk probability [11]; that is, given
ntotal number of events, then the risk probability, Prisk, that a specific resource
type is damaged by a specific type of user, is approximated by the relative
frequency:
Prisk ≈ nspecific
ntotal
with the usual assumption that:
Prisk = lim
ntotal→∞
nspecific
ntotal
and where nspecific is the number of times the resource has been recorded as dam-
aged by some user type. In the most general form of this definition, ntotal should
represent the total number of times the damaged resource was accessed. How-
ever, due to the open nature of the VCDB dataset, which restricts the release of
this kind of critical information (as well as other information, e.g. the correlation
among the different events), we adopt a more limited and VCDB-constrained
definition of ntotal, which represents only the total number of resources damaged
in Cyber security incidents.
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We argue that the vast majority of existing works in literature follow instead
a model-based approach paying little attention to such growing body of large
security-related information available in the open domain. This is despite the
fact that analysis of security datasets has been a central activity in some many
areas of computer security-related research (e.g. [12, 13]) as well as other more
general security areas (e.g. [14, 15]). Therefore, the main contribution of this
work is to demonstrate a simple but general approach in which data-based evi-
dence publicly available can be used to drive the decision making process when it
comes to the evaluation of access control decisions. However, the current paper
is aimed only at sketching up the approach to address an interesting and much
needed idea, and demonstrate it with some simple examples. It is by no means
an exhaustive study and so future work will extend this work both in terms of
its techniques and metrics as well as its applicability to more complicated real
world case studies that will validate better the proposed approach.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give an
overview of the current state-of-the-art literature in risk-based access control and
compare the various open Cyber security datasets. In Section 3, we give some
background on the main concepts included in this work, including VERIS and
XACML. In Section 4 we summarise our approach. In Section 5, we show how we
transform concepts from the XACML language to entities in the VERIS schema.
This will be particularly focused on transforming subjects and resources. In
Section 6, we give a VCDB-based data-driven definition of the risk probabilities
of every type of actors damaging every type of asset. In Section 7, we define
a set of risk probability constraints that we use as examples to demonstrate
the applicability of our approach. We give an example in Section 8 and discuss
in Section 9 our findings and contributions. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 10 giving directions for future work.
2. Related Work
2.1. Risk-based Access Control
The idea of defining, analysing and enforcing security policies based on a
model of risk has been widely researched in the security community and there
is a plethora of works in literature that combine the two concepts of risk and
access control under the same framework and at various levels of abstraction.
We group this literature into two broad areas: risk-based decision making (e.g.
[16, 17, 18, 19, 20]) and risk-based policy configuration (e.g. [21, 22, 23, 24]).
Risk-based decision making is concerned with the use of risk as a guid-
ing factor when evaluating access control decisions. Dimmock et al. [16] pro-
posed a model that incorporated risk analysis into the decision making process
when granting access to resources in a distributed system. Their model is im-
plemented based on the Open Architecture for Secure Interworking Services
(OASIS), which included a language for expressing Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) policies [25]. The model also defines predicates for thresholding risk,
which allow a decision to permit access to be deemed either risky or not. An-
other model that extends RBAC policy evaluation with risk is proposed by [17].
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Their main contribution is based on computing risk at runtime when a policy is
evaluated. The main difference from our proposed approach here is that their
risk computation is not empirical, rather based on a model-driven approach.
Cheng et al. [18] proposed the extension of Multi Level Security (MLS)
based access control policies with risk, in what they termed fuzzy MLS policies.
Their model incorporates the probability of human misbehaviour as well as
inadvertent information disclosures. Their approach follows a quantified risk-
adaptive access control approach, where the band between deny and permit
decisions is deemed to be a fuzzy area where access may be granted subject to
mitigation controls.
Molloy et al. [20] propose a new model of decision making (e.g. the XACML
PDP), which includes a risk assessment element. Unlike traditional decision
making processes, which render a binary decision, this new model also include
a decision defer outcome. The allow, deny or defer outcomes are coupled with
a set of metadata that represent gains, costs and damages associated with a
particular outcome. Again, such a model suffers from the complexity associated
with determining such multi-dimensional risk values from real world data, and
as such, would be impractical in reality.
XACML [26] itself has been considered as a medium for incorporating quan-
titative definitions of risk. In [19], the authors extend the XACML standard
with primitives for expressing qualified risk adaptive access control. The new
language, termed RXACML, considers both the risk of allowing access and the
risk of denying access. As we outline in this paper, it is relatively straightforward
to quantify the risk of granting access based on security incidents information,
however, it is far less obvious calculating the risk of denying access due to the
lack of any concrete data.
Risk-based policy configuration, on the other hand, is concerned with the
use of risk as a factor when designing and configuring access control policies.
Aziz et al. [21] consider the problem of reducing risk in RBAC policies as
a reconfiguration problem. They define a risk-aware semantic model for such
policies, and then introduce a reconfiguration analysis that reconfigures a risky
policy into a less risky one. More recently, Bijon et al. proposed a framework
in [22, 23] for defining risk-aware RBAC policies. The framework introduces
a set of algorithms that can be used to define new RBAC policies (relations)
taking into consideration risk, both as a quantitative and qualitative concept.
In [24], Krautsevich et al. propose the extension of the Usage Control [27]
model of security policies with quantitative risk methods. Their model of risk
is integrated within an extension of XACML [26], termed U-XACML [28], for
expressing usage control policies.
Aside from the decision-making and policy configuration problems, other
works have used risk to improve the understanding of the quality of infrastruc-
tures and processes involved in the management of data and information. For
example, Schla¨ger and Nowey [29] propose the use of annual loss expectancy as a
measure of risk when assessing and managing authentication and authorisation
infrastructures. Their model is geared towards the analysis of infrastructures
rather than access control policies, as is our aim here. In [30], another model,
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called benefit and risk access control, is proposed, which combines the risk of
information disclose with the benefit of information sharing, when evaluating
transactions that involve the movement of data. In [31], the concept of risk is
combined with that of trust in proposing a new access control mechanism that
takes the two concepts into consideration when granting access to Grid-based re-
sources, and in [32], risk is used to measure the consequences of non-conformity
between a real execution of a business process and its specified description.
Finally, some other works, such as [33], treat the notion of risk as a quality,
therefore they are less relevant to our perception of risk as a quantity.
In all the above example works, and many others, risk is defined as an
abstract quantity or a mathematical value that can be calculated from specific
operations. This is even the case in more recent works such as [34], who proposed
a risk-aware framework for enforcing access control policies in Grid systems and
[35] who did the same for Cloud systems. None such works suggest a data-driven
empirical approach to the problem of evaluating and configuring security policies
based on concrete real world datasets, which is where our work here provides
its major contribution. Most of the current literature adopts a model-driven
approach to the definition of risk in the context of security policies.
Perhaps the closest work to ours is that proposed in [36], where the problem
of missing attribute values in evaluating attribute-based access control policies,
such as those written in XACML, is seen as a non-deterministic retrieval process
that can be formulated in terms of a model of attribute probabilities. This
can then be used to analyse the correctness probability of a policy decision
evaluation. The main difference from our proposed method is that in our case,
we do not doubt the correctness of an attribute value (for example, as the
value may be missing or dubious), rather we estimate how dangerous the policy
can be given the combination of particular attribute values (in our case, the
combination of the subject and the resource it is allowed to access) based on
empirical evidence existing in open data.
2.2. Comparison of Open Cyber Security Datasets
As we stated in the Introduction, recent years have noticed the opening of
several datasets related to Cyber security, attack incidents and other relevant
information in the domain to the public. Of these, the most notable ones are Se-
cRepo [6], VCDB [4], CERT’s Vulnerability Notes Database at Carnegie Mellon
University [5], CAIDA [7] and the open datasets from the Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) [8]. Due to its suitability, our choice in this work has been
VCDB, which we discuss in the next section. However, we provide here an
overview and discussion of the characteristics of the other datasets.
2.2.1. SecRepo
“SecRepo.com - Samples of Security Related Data” [6] is a repository and
directory of various datasets related to the security domain maintain by Mike
Sconzo. The datasets are categorised by their relevance into categories such as
network, system, malware, file, password, threat feeds and others. Despite being
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a rich repository, the datasets referred to do not relate to incidents specifying
types of users and resources, and are therefore outside the scope of our work in
this paper. However, we consider this repository to be of value for any future
studies that would be focused on malware, system and network security.
2.2.2. CERT’s Vulnerability Notes Database
The CERT Vulnerability Notes Database [5] provides a list of software vul-
nerabilities discovered including summaries of the vulnerabilities, their techni-
cal detail, mitigation information and lists of affected vendors. The database
is more geared towards describing vulnerabilities rather than actual incidents,
and does not relate directly to types of resources nor does it mention what roles
of attackers may be able to benefit from the vulnerabilities. Thus, the informa-
tion included in the database does not map in any intuitive manner to XACML
policy concepts. The database also includes metrics based on the Common Vul-
nerability Scoring System (CVSS) standard [37]. The CVSS metrics providing
a score for the severity of vulnerabilities, and can be used in the future for any
new impact-related study.
2.2.3. CAIDA
The Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) set [7] is a collection
of datasets, monitors and reports not all directly related to the security domain
(some are related to network traffic and topology information, for example), but
from which security information can be obtained nonetheless. In general, all the
referenced datasets are more relevant to network security than to access control-
based security, and therefore, we do not consider these to be of relevance to the
approach proposed in this paper. Like SecRepo, in order to explore further
the structure of these data, it is necessary to study the individual datasets and
reports included in the collection.
2.2.4. LANL Open Datasets
The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) open datasets [8] consist
currently of two datasets. The first represents “Comprehensive, Multi-Source
Cyber-Security Events” that include authentication events, process start and
stop events, network flow events, DNS resolution events and events taken from
the authentication data that present known compromise events. Of these,
the last is probably most related to our work. This dataset has the form
“time, user@domain, source computer, destination computer”, which repre-
sents a compromise event at some given time. Since this dataset refers directly
to anonymised user identities and anonymised resource identities without ref-
erencing their types, it would not be possible to directly map from subjects
and resources in an XACML policy to elements of this dataset or vice versa.
Therefore, we do not consider the dataset here. The second dataset represents
user-computer authentication associations in time, which is of little relevance
to our policy configuration problem particularly again that neither the type of
the computer (resource) nor the role of the user are referenced in the dataset.
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3. Background
3.1. VERIS: A Schema for Describing Cyber Security Incidents
The Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) [10] is
a dataset and schema defining a set of metadata and metrics for describing
Cyber security incidents. It is currently considered a leading provider of open
quality information in the IT security domain and provides a framework that
organisations can use to collect and share information on security incidents in
a responsible and anonymous manner, with the aim of constructing a ground
on which researchers and experts in the IT security industry can cooperate to
learn from their knowledge and experiences.
The VERIS schema itself consists of five general categories, containing de-
scriptions of the security incidents in the VERIS dataset. These five categories
can be summarised as follows:
• Incident Tracking : this category contains general information about the
incidents, for example, the source identity, summary of the incident and
whether the incident is related to other incidents.
• Victim demographies: this category contains information related to the
organisation being affected by the incident, for example, its country of
operation, number of employees, revenue and industry type.
• Incident description: this category contains information related to the
question of “who did what to what (or whom) with what result”. It is
based on the A4 threat model developed by Verizon and contains descrip-
tions related to the Actors, Assets, Actions and Attributes (A4) of an
incident. Here, we focus only on the Actors and Assets metadata, as these
can directly relate to concepts in XACML.
• Discovery and response: this category contains information related to the
incident’s timeline, its discovery method, root causes, corrective actions
and so on.
• Impact assessment : this last category contains information on loss cate-
gorisation and estimation and impact rating. As we highlight later, infor-
mation in this category is currently poor, therefore we do not consider it
here.
The significance of the VERIS dataset lies in the fact that it is a community-
based dataset. This means that its data are collected from a wide range of
industries and varied over different types and sizes of organisations, therefore
providing a rich ground for organisations to learn about the various risks and
threats that could exist on a global level.
On the other hand, the VERIS dataset, known as VCDB [4], has currently
over 6800 recorded incidents (latest update as of November 2016), with its
schema metadata ranging over 2500 elements. In these, there were 8146 assets
reported to have been affected. Of these, only 585 (approx. 8.5%) were reported
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to be of type Unknown, therefore we consider this data to be of reasonably good
quality. On the other hand, there were 3402 internal actors reported to have
been involved in these incidents
The quality of the data on the impact of incidents as reported under the
overall rating metadata is poor in the current version of VCDB. Out of the
6860, over 80% of incidents have an unknown impact and only in one incident
(i.e. in 0.015% of cases) was such impact reported in detail. The rest of the
incidents have unreported rating for their impact.
One of the drawbacks of the dataset in VCDB is that nothing is reported on
the correlation between compromised assets, and whether attacks have complex
vectors. Incidents are reported as independent of one another; i.e. there is no
information suggesting that several incidents are part of the same attack. This
is likely to be due to anonymity reasons, but it does prevent more complex
probabilistic analyses to be applied, for example the likelihood that a specific
type of actor can launch a complex attack over multiple resources.
Additionally, VERIS lacks information related to whether access control
breaches were part of the Cyber security incidents. This means that inevitably,
there would be cases where the incidents are not related to the problem of
access control, and hence, our adopted analysis later is an approximation of the
real number of cases. Nonetheless, we argue that this approximation (e.g. of
the probability that a specific type of actors would damage a specific type of
resources) is a safe one.
Generally, we chose the VERIS/VCDB dataset over other datasets (e.g. [5,
6, 7]) due to the straightforward nature of the mapping from XACML elements
(subjects and resources) to VERIS schema elements (actors and asset varieties).
Our approach is general enough to be able to incorporate probabilities created
based on the analysis of any other dataset, which would be deemed suitable
in terms of its content. Such probabilities would then be combined with the
existing results (see Appendix A) to achieve more refined results. This could
be carried out as an element of future research stemming from the current work.
3.2. XACML: An Industrial Standard for Access Control Policies
XACML stands for the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language, which
is in its core a special XML schema for expressing access control policies and
rules. XACML is maintained by OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of
Structured Information Standards) and is currently in its 3rd version [9]. In
addition to the schema, XACML also defines a reference architecture based on
the concept of a policy enforcement point that implements and enforces XACML
policies. The XACML policy language model is shown in Figure 1.
In the context of this paper, our main interest in XACML is related to its
definition of subjects and resources as parts of a security policy’s target. A
subject is defined as an actor whose attributes can be referenced by predicates
and who represents the entity requesting access to some resource. On the other
hand, a resource represents any data, service or system component to which
access is requested.
8
Figure 1: The XACML Policy Language Model [9]
We keep an open view of the specific attributes that identify a subject or a
resource. For example, a subject could be identified through attributes related
to its identity, IP address or DNS name:
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:subject:authn-locality:ip-address
or urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:authn-locality:dns-name
Similarly, for resources, they may be identified through attributes related to the
identity or file name (in the case the resource is a considered a file):
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id
oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:simple-file-name
Our analysis of risk probabilities is not limited by the source of such attributes,
only by how these attributes are mapped to VERIS concepts as we discuss in
Section 5.
4. Our Approach
Our approach can be summarised in Figure 2. The dark-coloured boxes
represent the various outcomes from this approach and the arrows represent the
steps that need to be taken to generate those outcomes.
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Figure 2: Our Proposed Approach
Our starting point are the assets owned by an organisation and the security
policies protecting those assets set up by the administrators. The first step in-
volves identifying and extracting policy attributes that refer to internal subjects
within the organisation and the resources they can access. These attributes are
then transformed to VERIS schema concepts, which in our case, will be the
Actors and Assets metadata. Our focus in this work is on internal actors, as
an example, however, the analysis can be expanded to also the external and
partner actors. Once we are in the VERIS model, we are able to calculate the
frequency-based probability approximate of a type of actor damaging a type of
resource, based on the data recorded in VCDB. This gives us the probability
of the risks involved by having a badly configured policy. The next step then
is to check how bad such configuration is by validating whether any number of
constraints on the risk probabilities calculated in the previous step are violated
for the given policy. This information is then used as input to a decision-making
process that aims to mitigate against the effects of such risks in the policy. Such
mitigation mechanisms may include, for example, the security hardening of the
assets, the reconfiguration of the system or the policy protecting the assets or
the replacement of assets or policies altogether with more security ones. This is
then fed back into the original organisation set up, and the approach is repeated
until a fixed point is reached.
In the following sections, we focus on the transformation of concepts, the
definition of risk probabilities and give examples of constraints on policies.
5. From XACML to VERIS Model Transformation
Our first step here is to transform elements in the XACML model to elements
in the VERIS schema. In the following sections, we focus on transforming
subject attributes to actors and resources to asset varieties.
5.1. Transforming Subjects to Actors
We consider in this paper only internal actors; i.e. employees or people in
roles internal to some organisation. In future works, we shall also consider the
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risk analysis of external actors and partners of organisations; the other two
broad types of actors that the VERIS schema considers.
We define the set of all VERIS internal actors as Actors = {Auditor,
Call Center, Cashier, End-user, Executive, Finance, Helpdesk,
Human Resources, Maintenance, Manager, Guard, Developer,
System administrator, Unknown, Other}. We shall use this set as the range for
our transformation function.
On the other hand, we assume that XACML subjects are captured by the
values of attributes such as subject-id, ip-address or dns-name, although
these can be extended to include the values of any other attributes, as long as
the attribute defines the identity of a subject. We refer to the set of all XACML
subjects as Subjects, which represents the values that any subject attribute can
assume. We shall write Subjectspolicy ⊆ Subjects to refer to the set of subjects
that appear in a specific XACML policy or policy set. Similarly, we define
Actorspolicy ⊆ Actors as the subset of actors that corresponds to the subjects
referenced in a specific XACML policy.
We define the following transformation function to transform XACML sub-
jects to VERIS actors:
Tsu : Subjects→ Actors
Which permits us to define more specifically Actorspolicy as the set {a : a ∈
Actors ∧ (∃s ∈ Subjectspolicy. a = Tsu(s))}. In reality, the definition of Tsu will
be specific to each organisation. It’s instantiation will be carried out according
to some internal role-based access control policy, which will be used to align the
roles of the policy with VERIS actor values above. For example, if we assume
that the organisation’s policy considers a subject named James Brown to be in
the role of a manager, then we will have that Tsu(James Brown) = Manager.
5.2. Transforming Resources to Asset Varieties
Next, we need to give a type for XACML resources in terms of VERIS
concepts. This is done by mapping XACML resources to what is known as an
asset in the VERIS schema. The VERIS terminology provides a type for each
asset affected in an incident called the asset’s variety.
The set of all VERIS asset varieties is defined as the set AssetVariety =
{Server - Authentication,Server - Backup,Server - Database,
Server - DHCP,Server - Directory (LDAP, AD),
Server - Distributed Control System (DCS),Server - DNS,Server - File,
Server - Log or Event Management,Server - Mail,Server - Mainframe,
Server - Payment Switch or Gateway,Server - POS Controller,
Server - Print,Server - Proxy,Server - Remote Access,
Server - SCADA System,Server - Web Application,
Server - Code Repository,Server - Virtual Host,Server - Other,
Server - Unknown,Network - Access Control Reader,
Network - Camera or Surveillance System,Network - Firewall,
Network - Hardware Security Module (HSM),Network - IDS or IPs,
Network - Mobile Broadband Network,
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Network - Private Branch Exchange (PBX),Network - Private WAN,
Network - Programmable Logic Controller (PLC),Network - Public WAN,
Network - Remote Terminal Unit (RTU),Network - Router or Switch,
Network - Storage Area Network (SAN),Network - Telephone,
Network - VoIP Adapter,Network - Wired LAN,Network - Wireless LAN,
Network - Other,Network - Unknown,
User Device - Authentication Token or Device,
User Device - Media Player or Recorder,
User Device - Desktop or Workstation,User Device - Laptop,
User Device - Mobile Phone or Smartphone,User Device - Peripheral,
User Device - POS terminal,User Device - Tablet,User Device - Telephone,
User Device - VoIP phone,User Device - Other,User Device - Unknown,
Public Terminal - Automated Teller Machine (ATM),
Public Terminal - Detached PIN Pad or Card Reader,
Public Terminal - Gas “Pay-at-the-Pump” Terminal,
Public Terminal - Self-Service Kiosk,Public Terminal - Other,
Public Terminal - Unknown,
Media - Backup Tapes,Media - Disk Media,Media - Documents,
Media - Flash Drive or Card,Media - Hard Disk Drive,Media - Smart Card,
Media - Payment Card,Media - Other,Media - Unknown,
People - System Administrator,People - Auditor,People - Call Center,
People - Cashier,People - Customer,People - Developer,People - End-user,
People - Executive,People - Finance,People - Former Employee,
People - Guard,People - Helpdesk,People - HR,People - Maintenance,
People - Manager,People - Manager,People - Other,People - Unknown,
Unknown}
On the other hand, we assume that resources are identified in an XACML
policy by the values of resource-related attributes in XACML such as resource-id
or simple-file-name and any other relevant attributes. We call the set of all
resources Resources and the resources referenced in a specific XACML policy
Resourcespolicy ⊆ Resources. We define the transformation function on XACML
resources as follows:
Tre : Resources→ AssetVariety
which maps a resource in XACML to one of the above asset varieties. This
function allows us to define more precisely the set of asset varieties corre-
sponding to some XACML policy as the set AssetVarietypolicy = {v : v ∈
AssetVariety ∧ (∃r ∈ Resourcespolicy. v = Tre(r))}. The instantiation of Tre
can be done at an organisational level with regards to some internal policy,
which will identity the asset variety type of each resource in the organisation.
For example, it could be considered that files are a type of documents, hence
Tre(file) = Media - Documents.
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6. A Data-driven Definition of Risk Probabilities
We define risk based on the standard formula that describes it as the product
of probability by impact:
risk = probability× impact
This definition of quantitative risk was first articulated in a formal manner
within the domain of computing systems by IBM’s Robert Courtney, Jr. [38].
This formula for risk was adopted earlier by the National Bureau of Standards
in its Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) publication number 65,
Guideline for Automatic Data Processing Risk Analysis [39], which quantified
risk using a metric called Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE).
Whilst calculating the probability of an event occurring in the future is by
itself a predictive exercise and as such much work has been done in literature on
predicting the probabilities of new security incidents (e.g. [40, 41]), the predic-
tion of the impact of new incidents from the impact of older ones, particularly
those that would have occurred in a different organisation, is futile, since the
business value of the affected assets and the indirect cost of incidents is a local
model that cannot be ported across organisations. Even notable works like [42],
have stopped at the analysis of the impact of security incidents on the market
without attempting to predict future impact. As a result, there has been a
severe lack of insight in literature into how impact of new security incidents
can be derived from the impact of past ones. Therefore, at this stage, we focus
only on the definition of risk probability and defer the study of impact to future
works.
Therefore, we give here a VCDB-based definition of the probability that
expresses how dangerous a specific type of internal actors may be in relation to
accessing a particular type of assets. We define a risk probability function, r, to
express this probability:
r : Actors×AssetVariety→ R
This function defines the risk probability for each type of VERIS actors in
relation to a particular type (variety) of assets, which the actor may affect
either maliciously or unmaliciously. Its definition is empirical in nature; it is
based on the data provided in the VCDB dataset, and therefore it provides
a true real world reflection of the probability that some actor will misuse an
asset. Its concept is general; one can easily exchange the data in VCDB with
data from another source, as long as the information provided is compatible
with the signature of r.
For the case of VCDB, we calculate this probability for each asset variety s
as the ratio between the number of assets Na,s affected by a particular actor a
over the total number of all assets affected in all incidents N :
r(a, s) :
Na,s
N
× 100% (1)
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Naturally, when an asset s is not affected by the actions of an actor a, then
Na,s = 0 and consequently, this gives us an empirical evidence that r(a, s) = 0%
in relation to the data provided by VCDB.
The full VCDB-based definition of r is provided in detail in Appendix A,
where each Actor’s probability of damaging an Asset Variety is calculated ac-
cording to (1) above.
7. Risk Probability Constraints
After defining the VCDB-based r function, the next step would be to set
up any number and type of risk probability constraints that an organisation
may wish to check on its internal access control policies expressed as XACML
policies. In terms of their nature, constraints are logical formulæ that evaluate
to a Boolean value. We give here a few examples of such constraints.
7.1. Actor Risk Probability Constraint
The first example of constraints we define here is a constraint on the max-
imum risk probability k that an organisation is willing to tolerate (i.e. its
appetite) regarding any type of actors, in the context of some policy :
Cactor(k, policy) = ∀a ∈ Actorspolicy, s ∈ AssetVarietypolicy :
rule permitting access(a, s, policy)⇒ r(a, s) ≤ k
Where rule permitting access(a, s, policy) is a predicate that returns True when-
ever there exists a rule in the policy permitting access to s by a. The constraint
states that the probability level for any actor with respect to any asset that
it can access, as evaluated by the r function, must not exceed k, where k is
selected based on some internal decision-making process.
A more refined version of this constraint would specify for each different
actor, a, their own appetite value ka, as follows:
C′actor(ka, a, policy) = ∀s ∈ AssetVarietypolicy :
rule permitting access(a, s, policy)⇒ r(a, s) ≤ ka
Again the selection of ka must be based on some decision-making process inter-
nal to the organisation itself.
This type of constraints represents the appetite an organisation is willing
to have with respect to the risk posed by a specific type of actors, either in
a uniform or a nonuniform manner. In a practical setup, it would constitute
part of a profile of a specific role in an access control policy, which would be
consulted whenever new users are added to that role. It is easy to envisage how
such risk profile could be used to enhance role assignment [43] in an XACML
policy (set).
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7.2. Asset Risk Probability Constraint
The second example of risk probability constraints is on the maximum risk
probability, ks, tolerated for some individual asset, s, over all the types of actors
that can access s in some given policy:
Casset(ks, s, policy) = ∀a ∈ Actorspolicy :
rule permitting access(a, s, policy)⇒ r(a, s) ≤ ks
It is also possible to define a different variant of this constraint that aggregates
the probabilities of all the actors allowed to access the asset s:
C′asset(ks, s, policy) =
(
∑|MSet|
i=1 r(ai, s)) ≤ ks, where ai ∈ MSet
and MSet = {|a : a ∈ Actorspolicy ∧ rule permitting access(a, s, policy)|}
MSet is a multiset representing all the actors in the policy (preserving their
multiplicity) where there is an access-permitting rule that allows them access
to the resource s.
Similar to the previous pair of constraints on actors, these constraints can
be used in practice as part of the conditions of deployment of specific types of
resources in an organisation. For example, if the resource is provided as a service
to external users, those users may request as part of the service level agreement
that the resource have a maximum level of risk probability associated with it
with respect to the actors that have access to it.
7.3. Overall Policy Risk Probability Constraint
The last example of such constraints represents an aggregation of individual
policy risk probabilities for each of the assets mentioned in the policy:
Cpolicy(k, policy) = (
∑|AssetVarietypolicy|
j=1
∑|MSet|
i=1 r(ai, sj)) ≤ k
where ai ∈ MSet, sj ∈ AssetVarietypolicy
and MSet = {|a : a ∈ Actorspolicy ∧ rule permitting access(a, sj , policy)|}
This constraint, which is a general form of C′asset, covers all the actor/asset
combinations in a policy. Naturally, ai and sj are obtained from the model
transformations of Section 5, as the actual entities in an XACML policy are
subjects and resources.
This kind of constraints can be used in a real setup for liability insurance
purposes, for which the risk profile of the whole policy committed between the
organisation and the resources/users is required.
8. Example: Employee Records
We consider here the scenario from Dell EMC [44], which deals with policies
regulating employee records’ access and update in an organisation. The example
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starts with the assumption that any user of a record management application can
access and update their own organisational records in addition to any direct and
indirect reports generated based on those records. Furthermore, other employees
in the organisation with proper authorisation, e.g. employees in the human
resources department, can also view all the other employees’ records.
Sam is an employee who is an end-user. He requires access to his self-
appraisal document, self-appraisal-2009. Additionally, both Michelle, who
is Sam’s manager, and Peter, who is Michelle’s manager and head of division,
require access to Sam’s absence records. Finally, Diane, who is an officer in
the human resources department requires only a view access to the records. A
simple XACML policy expressing the above scenario as an access control list is
depicted below [44]:
<Policy PolicyId="pol_self-appraisal-2009" RuleCombiningAlgId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:permit-overrides">
<Description>ACLs for Sam’s 2009 self appraisal</Description>
<Target>
<Resources>
<Resource>
<ResourceMatch MatchId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> self-appraisal-2009
</AttributeValue>
<ResourceAttributeDesignator>
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id
</ResourceAttributeDesignator>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
</Resources>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId="rul_self-appraisal-2009_sam" Effect="Permit">
<Description>Sam can do anything with his 2009 self appraisal</Description>
<Target>
<Subjects>
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> Sam
</AttributeValue>
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id
</SubjectAttributeDesignator>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject>
</Subjects>
</Target>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId="rul_self-appraisal-2009_michelle+peter+diane" Effect="Permit">
<Description>Sam’s bosses and HR can only view the report</Description>
<Target>
<Actions>
<Action>
<ActionMatch MatchId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id
</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator>
view
</ActionAttributeDesignator>
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</ActionMatch>
</Action>
</Actions>
</Target>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-is-in">
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id
</SubjectAttributeDesignator>
<Apply FunctionId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag">
<AttributeValue DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> Michelle
</AttributeValue>
<AttributeValue DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> Peter
</AttributeValue>
<AttributeValue DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> Diane
</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
</Policy>
In the above example, subjects are identified using the attribute (part of the
incoming request) subject-id, which is matched against the above names using
the functions string-equal and string-bag. In order to obtain the type of
actor and asset variety in terms of the VERIS schema, we give the following two
transformation definitions, so that we can map the subjects and the resources
to the VERIS schema:
Tsu = {(Sam,End-user), (Michelle,Manager), (Peter,Executive),
(Diane,HR)}
Tre = {(self-appraisal-2009,Documents)}
These definitions are only for demonstration and are constructed based on
the scenario itself. In a real case, they will need to be predefined in advance
by the policy administration team in the organisation, in a more efficient and
general manner.
The risk probability for each of the above users causing a security damage
to self-appraisal-2009 as taken from the definition of r, is as follows:
- For Sam, r(End-user,Documents) = 1.927%
- For Michelle, r(Manager,Documents) = 0.172%
- For Peter, r(Executive,Documents) = 0.196%
- For Diane, r(HR,Documents) = 0.061%
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Now we consider how each of the constraints we defined earlier is upheld
under this scenario.
8.1. Evaluation of Risk Probability Constraints
The organisation may have various levels of appetite in relation to each of
the constraints mentioned above. We consider the following examples:
- Cactor(2.00%, pol self-appraisal-2009)
- C′actor(2.00%,End-user, pol self-appraisal-2009),
C′actor(0.2%,Manager, pol self-appraisal-2009),
C′actor(0.2%,Executive, pol self-appraisal-2009),
C′actor(0.1%,HR, pol self-appraisal-2009)
- Casset(2.00%,Documents, pol self-appraisal-2009)
- C′asset(2.50%,Documents, pol self-appraisal-2009)
- Cpolicy(2.50%, pol self-appraisal-2009)
In this case, we see that all of these constraints evaluate to True as no individual
type of actors or assets exceeds their risk probability limit and the overall policy
risk probability also remains within its limit.
However, assume that, as part of a new event requiring the re-structuring of
the organisation, new members of the board of executives Graham and Gail are
to be allowed access to Sam’s record. Despite the fact that both these members
still maintain the validity of the rest of the constraints, they however cause the
violation of the last two, C′asset and Cpolicy. This is because:
C′asset(2.50%,Documents, pol self-appraisal-2009) =
(
∑|MSet|
i=1 r(ai,Documents)) ≤ 2.5%
where, MSet = {|End-user,Manager,Executive,Executive,Executive,HR|}
And therefore, C′asset(2.50%,Documents, pol self-appraisal-2009) =
(1.927% + 0.172% + 0.196% + 0.196% + 0.196% + 0.061%) ≤ 2.5% = False
which violates the constraint. As a result, the organisation may re-consider
the requirement that Graham and Gail should have access to Sam’s record, or
if not possible, it will consider how to include additional protection mechanisms
for such a record.
9. Discussion
Our approach presented in this paper helps assign a risk meaning to access
control policies in terms of understanding the danger that specific types of users
can pose to organisational assets. Unlike most of the existing literature, it
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is data-driven and therefore evidence-based. In many ways, this is important
when configuring and deploying policies particularly at the bootstrapping stage,
when little or no local evidence is present at the organisation or team levels,
and therefore it is useful to draw from evidence present in open datasets such
as VERIS/VCDB.
We find however that the nature of open data may not be ideal or suited to
the kind of information an analyst would be looking for. For example, we had to
modify some of our probability definitions (e.g. Prisk) to take into account the
lack of any data on general accesses to organisational resources where no attacks
take place. Another example is the lack of data on the impact of incidents, which
restricts a more generalised definition of the risk of access control policies.
Nonetheless, we feel that the current approach provides benefits in terms
of the quantitative optimisation of access control policies. For example, it is
possible to conceive of the constraints presented in Section 7 as part of a chance
constraint problem that can be solved through a program [45] with the aim
of optimising the risk level of an access control policy. This optimisation then
would lead to the reconfiguration of the policy in order to meet business and
administrative requirements and conditions (see for example previous work by
the author in [21]).
Finally, the current model as it stands is VERIS-focused. While not neces-
sarily a negative aspect as it grounds the model on some concrete dataset (and
thus fulfils the evidence-based claim) and it provides a standardised language
for describing security events, it does limit the information that can be derived
when reasoning about the risk level of a policy. In particular, the lack of corre-
lation among the various events recorded in VCDB makes any frequency-based
analysis difficult to make.
There are a few directions for future work that we discuss next in the con-
cluding section.
10. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we presented a data-driven definition of the probabilities of
subjects damaging assets in organisations, which is rooted in the large open
data set of security incidents called VCDB.
There are several strands for future work that stem from the current work.
In the current paper, the focus was on internal roles of actors, however, VERIS
also provides definitions of roles for external and partner roles. This would pro-
mote the understanding of the risk probabilities for inter-organisational policies,
for example, such as those deployed in virtual organisations or federations. An-
other direction would be to incorporate security attributes into the risk formula,
which currently is limited to the probability of security compromises without
considering their effects. These attributes in VERIS are known as the Parke-
rian Hexad [3], which include confidentiality, possession, integrity, authenticity,
availability and utility.
We also plan to consider the impact of incidents into the risk formula to
define a more complete risk equation which includes both probability of the
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incident and its impact. VERIS includes information on the impact of incidents
in terms of the type of loss and its value incurred as a result of the incident,
however VCDB’s data provided on such information is currently poor, but this
could change in future editions of the VCDB.
Another area of improvement to the current approach is to consider the
risk of denying legitimate access to resources. However, since our approach is
entrenched in the data-driven philosophy, we will first need to discover publicly
available or obtain private datasets that contain information on such type of
risks, before we can extend our approach to include such risk.
Finally, in order for this approach to be usable, it is necessary as part of fu-
ture work to develop new tools or extend existing ones incorporate the evidence
produced from datasets and to use that evidence to evaluate any access control
constraints required by the organisation in protecting its resources.
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Appendix A. VCDB-based Definition of the r Function
The diagrams below (Figures A.3-A.17) represent the percentage of incidents
in which a given Actor will damage a particular Asset Variety, as recorded in the
VCDB dataset. The horizontal values are therefore percentages. For example,
in Figure A.3, the probability that an Auditor may damage a Database Server
is about 0.037% of the VCDB incidents.
Figure A.3: Auditors Risk Probabilities
Figure A.4: End-users Risk Probabilities
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Figure A.5: Call Centre Risk Probabilities
Figure A.6: Managers Risk Probabilities
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Figure A.7: System Administrators Risk Probabilities
Figure A.8: Maintenance Risk Probabilities
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Figure A.9: Developers Risk Probabilities
Figure A.10: Cashiers Risk Probabilities
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Figure A.11: Executives Risk Probabilities
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Figure A.12: Finance Risk Probabilities
Figure A.13: Guard Risk Probabilities
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Figure A.14: Helpdesk Risk Probabilities
Figure A.15: HR Risk Probabilities
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Figure A.16: Risk Probabilities for All the Other Roles
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Figure A.17: Risk Probabilities for All the Unknown Roles
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